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Abstract
On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) handed down an Advisory Opinion
concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory. In producing the Opinion, the Court traversed issues concerning its jurisdiction to deal
with the request, the applicable law, the adherence by Israel to that law, the right of self-defense
and the consequences of its findings of unlawfulness. It is well known that the long running issue
of Israeli and Palestinian reconciliation is a politically heated one and the work of the ICJ has not
been immune from the effects of this context. This Article asserts that the context overtook the
law in the production of the Opinion and has thereby distorted the result. As a consequence, the
ICJ has done significant damage to its credibility and to the aspects of international law traversed
in the Opinion.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OR DETRA CTION
On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
handed down an Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory (the "Advisory Opinion" or the "Opinion").' The Advisory Opin-
ion had been sought by the General Assembly.2 In producing
the Opinion, the Court traversed issues concerning its jurisdic-
tion to deal with the request, the applicable law, the adherence
by Israel to that law, the right of self-defense and the conse-
quences of its findings of unlawfulness.3 It is well known that the
long running issue of Israeli and Palestinian reconciliation is a
politically heated one and the work of the ICJ has not been im-
mune from the effects of this context. This Article asserts that
the context overtook the law in the production of the Opinion
and has thereby distorted the result. As a consequence, the ICJ
has done significant damage to its credibility and to the aspects
of international law traversed in the Opinion.
This Article will not enter into an analysis of the Israeli/
Palestinian problem, but will make objective comments on those
aspects of the Opinion that are incorrect as a matter of law. In
particular, it is vital that the deliberations of the Court in rela-
tion to the issues of the relationship between international hu-
* Dr. Kelly served in the Office of General Counsel in the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq and in Somalia, Bosnia, Kenya and East Timor. He is also an Associate
Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law-a collaborative initiative of the
University of Melbourne Law School and the Australian Defense Force Legal Service.
1. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
2. See Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ES-
10/L.16 (Dec. 3, 2003).
3. See Rebecca Kahan, Note, Building a Protective Wall Around Terrorists-How the
International Court ofJustice's Ruling in The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Made the World Safer for Terrorists and More
Dangerous for Member States of the United Nations, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 827, 831-33
(2005). See generally Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009.
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manitarian law ("IHL"), international human rights law and the
right of self-defense are addressed. The Opinion also gives rise to
a broader question of the weight to be given to ICJ advisory opin-
ions in defining and developing international law. It will be ar-
gued that this particular Opinion ought to be given no weight
because it has not contributed to the law or the resolution of the
underlying conflict but has instead detracted from its own repu-
tation and the law.
Throughout this Article, there are references to the "Israeli
security barrier" or "barrier." As with every other aspect of the
dispute between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the issue of
terminology is highly charged. On the one hand, the Israelis
would prefer to refer to the structure as the "separation fence"
or "fence," while the Palestinians are keen to promote the term
"wall."4 The ICJ ultimately decided to adopt the term used by
the General Assembly. This was the first indication of an unfor-
tunate tendency to prejudge this issue and the pitfalls of hearing
only one side of the argument. The Court, as it indicates in its
own reasoning, is not required to adhere to terminology or as-
sertions of the General Assembly and is, in fact, obliged to come
to its own position based on an objective legal analysis and the
facts.5 The correct position, as with much else in the troubled
area, lies somewhere in the middle. While the term "fence" con-
notes something less intrusive and permanent, the term "wall"
implies permanence and resonates with recent historical mem-
ory of the Berlin Wall. Of the 180 kilometers of the structure
completed at the time of the Opinion, only 8.5 kilometers could
be described as a concrete wall. The remainder is sensory fenc-
ing with supportive anti-vehicle ditches, patrol and trace roads
and barbed wire.6 Clearly then, it is not a wall, and in its totality,
it can not be considered a mere fence; thus, the term "barrier"
used by the U.N. Secretary-General seems the most appropriate.7
Why then did the Court choose the term "wall"? We shall see
that using this term was an attempt to bolster the clearly incor-
rect ruling that building the barrier amounts to an "annexation"
4. See id. at 1029, 1 67.
5. See id. at 1028, 1 62.
6. See id. at 1033, 1 82.
7. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution ES-i 0/13, 1 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/
248 (Nov. 24, 2003).
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of the parts of the occupied territories it encompasses because of
its tendency to permanence as a fait accompli. This is one of the
cumulative indicia of the lack of objectivity by the Court in this
case.
II. JURISDICTION
The idea that the ICJ be able to make advisory opinions as
distinct from dealing with contentious cases is certainly some-
thing that appears on the surface to be a meritorious concept.
However, an example that reflects the significant limitations on
the utility of the exercise exists where the matter is in reality
highly contentious, is part of a much broader dispute, and where
one of the parties would have critically important information to
bring to the table, which, if missing, would render the exercise
nugatory. All these factors were present in the subject case,
which led to some disquiet among a number of the judges and is
reflected in the qualified wording of the Opinion, itself a relevant
factor when considering the weight to be given to the case. It is
submitted that the cumulative effect of all these factors should
have led the Court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
The deficiencies of the Court's process are placed in stark
relief by the proceedings of the Israeli Supreme Court in the
matter of Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel.' In this
case, the Israeli Supreme Court had before it the detailed sub-
missions of the petitioners relating to specific locations and fac-
tors, as well as the complete arguments of not only the responsi-
ble security authorities but also useful amicus curiae submis-
sions, including from the private Council for Peace and Security.
Add to this the superior expertise of the Israeli Court on the law
of armed conflict and the ability of the Court to also deal with
Israeli administrative law provisions, and one sees the stark con-
trast in value and efficacy between the two decisions. What
makes the ICJ decision even more puzzling is the fact that the
Israeli Court ruling was handed down before the ICJ's, thus al-
lowing the ICJ to not only see that the matter was in hand in the
municipal jurisdiction, but also enabling them to have regard to
the arguably more correct legal analysis undertaken in that
8. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr., 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004).
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case.
9
The more specific difficulties faced by the ICJ were reflected
in the separate opinions. One of the problems facing the Court
was the proper interpretation of the Western Sahara Advisory Opin-
ion"° ("Western Sahara") in regard to the question of the exercise
of the Court's jurisdiction. One of the jurisdictional conditions
to be fulfilled required that the Court be satisfied that:
The object of the General Assembly has not been to bring
before the Court, by way of a request for advisory opinion, a
dispute or legal controversy, in order that it may later, on the
basis of the Court's opinion, exercise its powers and functions
for the peaceful settlement of that dispute or controversy.
The object of the request is an entirely different one: to ob-
tain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly
deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its func-
tions concerning the decolonization of the territory."
The Court here seemed to be indicating that the first situa-
tion described in the above extract would not be suitable for an
advisory opinion but that the latter was.12 According to Western
Sahara, the Advisory Opinion would very clearly fall within the first
category, and so there was a real issue that jurisdiction should
not be exercised or that, at the least, this point demanded eluci-
dation. As Judge Higgins stated in her separate opinion:
The Court has not dealt with this point at all in that part of its
Opinion on propriety. Indeed, it is strikingly silent on the
matter, avoiding mention of the lines cited above and any re-
sponse as to their application to the present case. To that
extent, this Opinion by its very silence essentially revises,
rather than applies, the existing case law.' 3
This is clearly an unsatisfactory approach to such critical is-
sues and it is submitted that Western Sahara is authority for the
fact that the court erred in determining to proceed in this case.
Judge Owada was also deeply troubled by the lack of fairness that
9. Compare the Advisory Opinion's decision date of July 9, 2004 with Beit Sourik's
earlier decision date of June 30, 2004.
10. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) [hereinafter Western
Sahara].
11. Id. at 26-27, 39.
12. See id.; see also Kahan, supra note 3, at 856-57.
13. See Advisoy Opinion, 43 1.L.M. 1009, 1060, 1 13 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins).
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arose as a result of the Advisory Opinion's transformation into a
contentious case. 4 He asserted that:
[T]he critical criterion for judicial propriety in the final anal-
ysis should lie in the Court seeing to it that giving a reply in
the form of an advisory opinion on the subject-matter of the
request should not be tantamount to adjudicating on the very
subject-matter of the underlying concrete bilateral dispute
that currently undoubtedly exists between Israel and Pales-
tine.15
He added that in relation to the requirements of the judicial
character of the Court:
One of such requirements for the Court as ajudicial body is the
maintenance of fairness in its administration ofjustice in the
advisory procedure in the midst of divergent positions and
interests among the interested parties. To put it differently, it
must be underlined that the Court's discretion in advisory
matters is not limited to the question of whether to comply
with a request. It also embraces questions of advisory proce-
dure. This requirement acquires a special importance in the
present case, as we accept the undeniable fact as developed
above that the present case does relate to an underlying con-
crete legal controversy or a dispute."
The paucity of material from the Israeli side, in what then
amounted to a contentious case, takes on special importance.
This disturbed a number of the judges. Judge Higgins com-
mented that the information provided by Israel "has only been
very partial." 7 Judge Buergenthal disagreed with the Court on
the jurisdiction issue on this ground alone stating:
[T]he Court did not have before it the requisite factual bases
for its sweeping findings; it should therefore have declined to
hear the case. In reaching this conclusion, I am guided by
what the Court said in Western Sahara, where it emphasized
that the critical question in determining whether or not to
exercise its discretion in acting on an advisory opinion re-
quest is "whether the Court has before it sufficient informa-
tion and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclu-
sion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of
14. See id. at 1094, 13 (separate opinion of Judge Owada)
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1094-95, 16 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1064, 40 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
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which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions com-
patible with its judicial character." In my view, the absence in
this case of the requisite information and evidence vitiates the
Court's findings on the merits.' 8
He noted that the Court never really considered the nature or
impact of the attacks conducted by terrorists operating across
the Green Line, and that the dossier provided by the United Na-
tions ("U.N.") to the Court, "on which the Court to a large ex-
tent bases its findings barely touches on that subject." 9
More generally, other comments were passed in the sepa-
rate opinions that further illustrated the disquiet caused by the
lack of objectivity of the Court. Thus, Judge Higgins was not sat-
isfied with the narrative background set out by the Court, which
she found "neither balanced nor satisfactory. '2 ° In such a com-
plex matter with implications for the overall settlement of a long
standing crisis, she asserted that, " [w] hat a court faced with this
quandary must do is to provide a balanced opinion, made so by
recalling the obligations incumbent on all concerned. I regret
that I do not think this has been achieved in the present case. "21
Judge Kooijmans was also troubled by the historical narrative,
calling it "two-dimensional. ' 22 He highlighted as an example
that it neglected to record the period during which Jordan had
control of the West Bank between the conclusion of the General
Armistice Agreement in 1949 and the Six Day War in 1967, as-
serting sovereignty over that territory and only relinquishing this
claim in 1988.23 Continuing this theme, Judge Kooijmans went
on to say that the Opinion:
[C] ould have reflected in a more satisfactory way the interests
at stake for all those living in the region. The rather oblique
references to terrorist acts which can be found at several
places in the Opinion, are in my view not sufficient for this
purpose. An advisory opinion is brought to the attention of a
political organ of the United Nations and is destined to have
an effect on a political process. It should therefore through-
out its reasoning and up till the operative part reflect the le-
18. Id. at 1078, 1 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 1060, 16 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
21. Id. at 1060, 17-18.
22. Id. at 1067, 7 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
23. See id. at 8.
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gitimate interests and responsibilities of all those involved
and not merely refer to them in a concluding paragraph. 24
Judge Buergenthal scathingly attacked the Court's failure
"to address any facts or evidence specifically rebutting Israel's
claim of military exigencies or requirements of national security"
and accused the Court of barely addressing "the summaries of
Israel's position on this subject that are attached to the Secre-
tary-General's report and which contradict or cast doubt on the
material the Court claims to rely on. ' 25 Judge Owada, after not-
ing his concern with the Court's approach to the case, empha-
sized that the Court was obliged to "be extremely careful not
only in ensuring the objective fairness in the result, but in seeing
to it that the Court is seen to maintain fairness throughout the
proceedings, whatever the final conclusion that we come to may
be in the end. ' 26 It seems that the Court was not able to achieve
objectivity in this case, and the case serves as a good example of
heated politics generating bad law, as we shall see from an analy-
sis of the findings on the merits of the case.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Human Rights v. Law of Armed Conflict?
Perhaps in no area of the case was the paucity of legal analy-
sis as apparent as that concerning the disentanglement of the
relative application of international human rights law and IHL.
If we accept the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction to deliver the
Opinion, a positive outcome of this could have been the first au-
thoritative and detailed consideration of how these bodies of law
interact in the context of a case study affording the opportunity
for, and indeed demanding, such a consideration. This failure
to achieve such an outcome was compounded by the approach
taken by the Court to deal with the barrier in relation to those
parts on occupied territory, as if it were one consolidated issue,
rather than the specifics of the unlawful aspects. In relation to
the various allegations of breaches of IHL, Judge Higgins was to
comment in this respect that:
It might have been expected that an advisory opinion would
24. Id. at 1068, 13 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 1080, 7 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
26. Id. at 1097, 25 (separate opinion of Judge Owada).
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have contained a detailed analysis, by reference to the texts,
the voluminous academic literature and the facts at the
Court's disposal, as to which of these propositions is correct
.... Further, the structure of the Opinion, in which humani-
tarian law and human rights law are not dealt with separately,
makes it in my view extremely difficult to see what exactly has
been decided by the Court.2 7
The key point to make here is that, in the context of real
operations, it is extremely important that there be as much clar-
ity and simplicity as possible if we are to expect military com-
manders and their staff to adhere strictly to legal standards. The
findings of the Court in this case have achieved exactly the oppo-
site effect and have added support to the arguments of those
who would say that international law in the context of real life is
too ambiguous, impractical, and incapable of strict compliance.
That is why it is imperative that the Opinion be deconstructed in
this respect in particular.
With respect to the application of IHL to the portions of the
barrier on occupied territory, it was undisputed that the Hague
Regulations of 1907 applied, notwithstanding that Israel is not a
party to them. This was based on the solid jurisprudence assert-
ing that the Regulations are declaratory of customary law, ac-
cepted as such by Israel and all the participants in the proceed-
ings.28 The Court also dealt with the Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949 ("GCIV"), which was more technically problematic but,
in practice, not really an issue, as Israel accepts the application
of the relevant provisions of the GC1V as customary law and pur-
ports to apply and operate in accordance with those standards.29
The Israeli Supreme Court has also regularly applied these provi-
sions to rulings on issues before it concerning the administration
of the occupied territories.3 ° What the Court failed to consider
were various other provisions relating to the law of occupation
set out in the Hague Cultural Property Convention and its Proto-
cols, and, in particular, the question of the customary law status
of a number of occupation provisions in Additional Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions ("Additional Protocol I"). This was a
27. Id. at 1061-62, ] 23-24 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
28. See id. at 1035, 89.
29. See id. at 93.
30. See id. at 1037, 100.
31. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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major flaw in the work of the Court, thereby missing an opportu-
nity to make a useful contribution to this area of the law.
In relation to the human rights instruments, the Court's
proposition was that the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights ("ICCPR"), 32 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), 33 and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("UNCROC")34
could continue to apply in armed conflicts and occupation situa-
tions, and in fact applied to the circumstances of the case. They
then cited some provisions of these instruments, which they
claimed had been breached. 5 In analyzing this position, it is
first necessary to determine whether human rights law and IHL
can have concurrent application. If the answer to this question
is "yes" or "perhaps," then it must be determined exactly what
the nature of the relationship is. There has certainly been a
trend in recent years by those bodies involved in the promotion
and enforcement of human rights law to assert a broader appli-
cation. This trend suffers, however, from the same lack of clarity
and precision as the subject Opinion.
The views of commentators are varied as to the application
of international human rights instruments to the administration
of an occupying power. Eyal Benvenisti, in supporting the appli-
cation of these conventions to occupations where the occupying
power has ratified them, asserts that they clearly provide for the
exigencies related to security emergencies or war conditions,
and therefore it was within the contemplation of the drafters
that they would apply in conflict situations.36 He claims that, if
and when the level of the security threat to the occupying power
subsides, the requirement to adhere to fundamental human
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, 1950, arts. 3(6), 4, 14, 15, 33, 34, 63, 64(3), 69, 70, 72-79, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol Additional I].
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
34. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCROC].
35. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1038-40, 1 102-13.
36. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to
the Occupied Territories, 26 ISR. L. REv. 24, 27-30 (1992). In particular, Benvenisti refers
to the case of Israel and the territories it occupies in relation to the international
human rights instruments Israel has ratified. See id.
190 FORDHAMITERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:181
rights as indicated in the Conventions will become more pro-
nounced. At the same time, the option to derogate from those
rights will also be available within the conditions that attach to
such derogations. The support cited for this position includes
the pronouncements on the issue by the U.N. General Assembly
and the Secretary-General. Benvenisti states that the above con-
ventions complement the law of occupation as they deal with
specific issues in greater detail, in particular in relation to politi-
cal rights."
Another argument put forward by Benvenisti, based on the
finding by the European Commission of Human Rights in Cyprus
v. Turkey,38 is that when a state becomes a signatory to the Con-
ventions, the application of them will extend to any territory
under the 'jurisdiction" of the State. 9 In the case of occupied
territory, Benvenisti points to the fact that the occupant is in the
position of temporary sovereign, or at least that the rights of ad-
ministration adhering to the occupant mean that the territory is
effectively in the occupant's jurisdiction.4" Benvenisti did not
adopt as robust a position in his general work on occupation in
1993 where he stated that:
If the political process is lawfully halted for the duration of
37. See id.
38. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; see also 62 INTER-
NATIONAL LAW REPORTS 230-32 (1978). The Commission determined that the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to
which Turkey was a High Contracting Party, applied to the Turkish military occupation
of northern Cyprus. See id. It found that the term "within their jurisdiction" contained
in Article 1 of the Convention referred to all persons under the High Contracting
Party's, "actual authority and responsibility, not only when that authority is exercised
within their own territory but also when it is exercised abroad." Id. at 230. This decision
is limited by the fact that Turkey did not seek to argue that a military occupation was in
place and that the laws of occupation applied and overrode the European Convention.
It instead based its case on the fact that a new State had been created (the Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus) and therefore it claimed no occupation existed and nojuris-
diction by Turkey was being exercised in the territory of this entity. See id. at 132-40.
There was therefore no evaluation by the court of the status of the human rights provi-
sions of the European Convention in relation to the laws of occupation. See id. In fact,
the violations complained of by the Republic of Cyprus against Turkey would also have
constituted violations of the laws of occupation and the situation would therefore have
been adequately covered by the occupation provisions. See id. 102-30. The decision is
also limited to situations involving High Contracting Parties of the European Conven-
tion. See id.
39. See Benvenisti, supra note 36, at 27-30.
40. See id. at 33-35; see also Interview with Eyal Benvenisti, Professor, Tel Aviv Univ.,
in Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
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the occupation, the suspension of political rights seems to be
a sensible consequence .... [Plolitical rights are often
among the first to be suspended by occupants, and this pro-
pensity has not been criticized as unlawful in principle. In
the interplay between the conflicting interests, the law of oc-
cupation concedes that certain civil and political rights will
from time to time be subjected to other concerns. Ulti-
mately, as in other cases, the occupant is required to balance
its interests against those of the occupied community. Thus,
as hostilities subside, and security interests can permit, the oc-
cupant could be expected to restore civil and political rights.
Under such circumstances, the human rights documents may
well serve as guidance for re-establishing civil and political
rights in the occupied territory.4 1
This statement seems much closer to the mark as it acknowl-
edges the primacy of occupation law and the relevance of the
levels of security threat to the degree of rights exercisable by the
occupant. Benvenisti also suggests human rights instruments
can be used for guidance in less exigent circumstances, sug-
gesting that the law does not apply de jure.4 2 This suggestion is
echoed by other commentators who are uncertain as to the sta-
tus of human rights instruments in this context.
Jaime Oraa claims that insofar as some aspects of human
rights law have attained the status of general international law,
particularly in relation to the elements of derogation and pro-
portionality, these aspects will be applicable to an occupation sit-
uation.4" John Quigley posits that while the law of occupation
applies in conflict situations, human rights law applies in both
peace and conflict. In support of the universality of human
rights law, Quigley refers to the statement by the U.N. Secretary-
General:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not refer in
any of its provisions to a specific distinction between times of
peace and times of armed conflict. It sets forth the rights and
freedoms which it proclaims as belonging to "everyone," to
"all," and formulates prohibitions by the phrase that "no one"
shall be subjected to acts of which the Declaration disap-
41. See ExAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 189 (1993) (em-
phasis added).
42. See id.
43. SeeJAMES ORA , HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
256-57 (1992).
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proves. The Declaration proclaims that the "universal and ef-
fective recognition and observance" of the rights and free-
doms shall be secured."
Quigley then goes on to refer to the conflict provision of the
ICCPR and compares this to the provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions and Fourth Geneva Convention, which are expressed to be
limited, setting no equivalent "universal standard.""5 In addi-
tion, he claims that "most scholars" disagree with the positions of
Jean Pictet, Henri Meyrowitz, and Esther Cohen that human
rights law is not applicable either in wartime or to the law of
occupation.46 The scholars referred to by Quigley assert that
general international human rights law and IHL are complimen-
tary and operate side by side in conflict situations."7 Quigley also
relies on the Cyprus case and General Assembly pronouncements
on the subject stating that "[flundamental human rights, as ac-
cepted in international law and laid down in international in-
struments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed con-
flict," in particular referring to the applicability of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") to military occupa-
tion." Quigley also relies upon commentators, such as Georg
Schwarzenberger, who asserted that occupants are not obliged
to respect local laws where they offend a standard of civiliza-
tion."9 This standard of civilization, according to Quigley, refers
to fundamental and universally accepted human rights as they
44. John Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Belligerent
Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of Assembly and Expression?,
12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Quigley, Belligerent Occupation].
45. ld. at 4-5.
46. See id. at 5-9.
47. See id. at 4-9.
48. Id. at 9-11.
49. See 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 195 (1968).
Schwarzenberger asserts in this respect that, even before the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, there was an exception to the stipulation to respect local laws:
It is concerned with the position of a civilized Occupying Power in the terri-
tory of an enemy who has relapsed into a state of barbarism. In so exceptional
a situation, compliance with the standard of civilization may demand action,
rather than the exercise of restraint. It may, for instance, make unavoidable
the exercise of the occupant's legislative powers for the double purpose of
destroying the legal foundations of such a barbarous system and restoring a
minimum of civilized life in the occupied territory.
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exist at the time of the occupation. -t ° Quigley points out the ex-
tensive rights of censorship available to the occupant to suppress
all hostile speech and assembly and contrasts this with the provi-
sions of human rights instruments, drawing the conclusion that
the former have given way to a norm calling for protection of
freedom of assembly and speech. Quigley asserts that this norm
has achieved the status of customary law and is binding beyond
those signatory to the treaties. He also extends this argument to
the formation of trade unions under military occupation."'
Dealing with the derogation provisions of the human rights
instruments, Quigley claims these are only available in relation
to the home territory of the occupant, notwithstanding his asser-
tion that the obligations of these laws apply in the occupied terri-
tory. 52 His reasoning in this respect is that:
It is questionable whether the "public emergency" exception
can apply in military occupation. It would be difficult to
demonstrate imminent threat since the territory of occupa-
tion is separate from (though possibly contiguous to) the ter-
ritory of the occupant. If there is serious disorder in occu-
pied territory, that may pose a threat to the occupier's contin-
ued control, but not necessarily to the occupying state itself.53
It is difficult to see how, on the one hand, the occupied ter-
ritory and the population can be considered to be under the
jurisdiction of the occupying power and the instruments applica-
ble, and yet, on the other hand, the derogation provisions would
not apply. Presumably, if the provisions can be binding on the
occupying power in relation to foreign territory, it is no further
leap to say that a threat to the life of the occupied nation consti-
tutes a public emergency in relation to which the occupying
power may act in accordance with those provisions (under Arti-
cle 4 of the ICCPR for example). Clearly, there are general
human rights customary principles that will apply to occupation
situations, but the primary reference point in determining the
rights of the population and the occupying power will be the
specific provisions of the extant conventions governing occupa-
50. See Quigley, Belligerent Occupation, supra note 44, at 6-13.
51. See John Quigley, The Right to Form Trade Unions Under Military Occupation, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 295-312
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
52. See Quigley, Belligerent Occupation, supra note 44, at 6-13.
53. Id. at 25.
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tion and State practice. To the extent that these are ambiguous
or do not cover a particular issue, general human rights princi-
ples may be turned to.5 4
No State has renounced the rights available to an occupant;
the relevant documents to consult in this regard are the various
military manuals, not statements that acknowledge standards ap-
plicable when a State is dealing with its own citizens. As an ex-
ample, the British and U.S. military manuals specifically assert
the full range of rights available to an occupant, including cen-
sorship.55 To state that an occupant is not permitted to stop
broadcasts inciting violence against it is patently contrary to all
forms of treaty provision, customary law, and State practice relat-
ing to occupation.56
James Demotses also regards human rights law as applicable
but does not go as far as Quigley, allowing for the availability of
the specified derogations, nor does he claim that the Hague
Regulations and Fourth Convention are redundant in any re-
spect. 57 In fact, Demotses's assertion is merely that although
human rights law was designed for peacetime, it is also useful
during occupations. It is not apparent how utility translates into
an obligation under international law. Demotses makes the well
supported point, however, that the UDHR is now customary in-
ternational law, but he does not explain how it interacts with the
specific conventions regulating occupation. Demotses does not
assert that the ICCPR is customary law-although some of its
provisions are accepted to be-but does maintain that signato-
54. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
55. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, Field Manual 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WAR-
FARE 377 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. ARa,, FIELD MANUAL].
56. See GERHARD VON GLAH-N, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 139 (1957):
Most writers as well as military manuals permit severe restrictions on the free-
dom of the press, suspension or closing of newspapers, and even imprison-
ment ofjournalists on the grounds that such control will tend to lessen materi-
ally the spirit of opposition in the native population and will aid in the sup-
pression of news items of military importance. Dispatches dealing with any
aspect of the war or of the occupation, and particularly stories hostile in tone
to the occupying authorities, are subject to strict censorship.
Id.
57. SeeJ.A. Demotses, Israeli Action in Response to the Intifada): Necessary Security Mea-
sures of Violations of International Law?, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 92, 97-100 (1992).
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ries must apply the law to territory under their military control.58
Adding to the weight of argument regarding the UDHR is
Steve Fireman. His position is that:
The provisions of the Geneva Convention ... were written to
interact with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights so as
to ensure human rights in times of peace and war. While the
Fourth Geneva Convention is more suited for temporary bel-
ligerent occupations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is more readily suited for prolonged occupations.
Consequently, the two sets of rules or standards are often ap-
plied in unison so as to guarantee a comprehensive set of
standards to protect human rights in both war and peace. 9
This position is more tenable given that the two documents, the
UDHR and the GCIV, were initiated in the post-war years of
1948 and 1949, respectively.60 The post-war context was certainly
significant and the UDHR appears to have been written with
conflict situations and the relationship between forces and civil-
ians in contemplation. Notwithstanding this, the Fourth Con-
vention, having been written subsequent to the UDHR, was
clearly intended to be the primary regime governing occupa-
tions, and to preserve the operation of the Hague Regulations,
so that the UDHR would only be applicable to the extent that it
does not conflict with specific provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions and the Fourth Convention.6" During the drafting of the
Fourth Convention, a proposal by the Mexican delegation to in-
clude wording that modifications to the law of the occupied ter-
ritory could only occur in accordance with the UDHR was in fact
rejected.6 2 It is important to note, however, the clear thread in
many of the arguments for the application of human rights law
that this becomes a more distinct proposition in the context of
prolonged occupations.
Other opinions and evidence suggest that human rights in-
58. See id.
59. Steve Fireman, The Impossible Balance: The Goals of Human Rights and Security in
the Israeli Administered Territories, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 421, 426-27 (1991).
60. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV].
61. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 30.
62. See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Comm. III,
18th mtg. at 671, vol. II, sec. A (May 18, 1949).
196 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:181
struments are definitely not applicable de jure. Jean Pictet re-
jected the application of human rights law categorically on the
grounds that humanitarian law was designed for the specific cir-
cumstances of occupation and conflict, while human rights law
was essentially applicable only in peacetime, having derogation
clauses for conflicts. He also highlighted that human rights law
governed relations between the State and its own nationals,
while IHL governed relations between a State and foreign na-
tionals. IHL is universal and mandatory, much of human rights
law is not, while the systems of supervision and sanctions are also
different. Pictet's conclusion is that "the two systems are compli-
mentary, and indeed they compliment one another admirably,
but they must remain distinct."6" They are "complimentary" in
the sense that the human rights regime will regulate the rela-
tionship between the State and its citizens, even during armed
conflicts, while IHL will operate side by side to ensure that the
situations of civilians in the hands of foreign military forces and
the manner in which a conflict is fought between or among the
parties are appropriately regulated.6 4
Henri Meyrowitz, in specifically addressing the occupation
situation, emphasizes the contrast with the domestic public law
relation presupposed by human rights, whereas in the occupa-
tion situation, there is no political or societal association.65 John
Quigley takes Meyrowitz's distinction of the two situations and
summarizes it as being a result of the presupposition of hostility
in the law of occupation based in an inherent conflict of inter-
ests. He asserts that human rights law is also founded on a simi-
lar conflict of interests between a government and its popula-
tion. He explains this conflict by presenting the following
formula: "The government desires to maintain itself in power,
while the population desires to avoid repression. There would
be no need for human rights law if hostility between the govern-
ment and the population did not exist. '66 This is clearly wrong.
Human rights law merely establishes a standard by which to
63. Quigley, Belligerent Occupation, supra note 44, at 5-6 (quoting JEAN PITET, Hu-
MANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VIcTIMs (1975)).
64. See id.
65. See Henri Meyrowitz, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Droits de l'Homme, 88 REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 1059, 1098-99
(1972).
66. Quigley, Belligerent Occupation, supra note 44, at 7.
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judge the performance of a government in relation to the rights
of the citizen. If one aspect of these rights is infringed, then a
government may be held to scrutiny for this, but there is no pre-
supposition of hostility or conflict of interests between the gov-
ernment and the whole population. The law of occupation also
does not presuppose hostility. It presupposes only that the main-
tenance of order is dependent on a recognition of the authority
of an occupying power, that there are basic human needs that
must be filled, and that it is necessary to provide a framework for
the regulation of the temporary relationship between the occu-
pying power and the population. The order it envisages is pri-
marily an obligation on the occupying power as something of
benefit to the population. The point to Meyrowitz's comments
is the very lack of a political and sovereign relationship between
an occupant and the people, which is the fundamental premise
of human rights law.6 7
Adam Roberts tends toward a personal belief in the applica-
tion of at least some aspects of human rights law but concedes
that the situation as a matter of law is ambiguous and he is not
convinced of the utility of pursuing the debate.6" He highlights
a number of flaws and inadequacies in the application of human
rights law to occupation situations: (a) there is uncertainty as to
the legal status of some of the human rights instruments; (b)
fewer States are party to them; (c) the human rights instruments
have derogation provisions based on "public emergencies," and
an occupant will be inclined to view the occupation as a public
emergency, especially where there is continuing conflict and in-
ternal disturbances; (d) the conventional law governing occu-
pants is more extensive, more detailed, and relevant than
human rights instruments and their supervisory machinery may
be more appropriate; and (e) on specific issues, there may be
conflict between the two bodies of law as in relation to the guar-
antees of freedom of movement and speech in the human rights
instruments.6" He then states that there are aspects of human
rights law that would be highly desirable to apply to occupations
and that it would probably assume prominence in the interim
67. See id. at 6-7.
68. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Militay Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
1967-1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
supra note 51, at 25, 53.
69. See id. at 56-57.
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period following an agreement to terminate the occupation
before the territory has a legitimate sovereignty established.7 °
The specific issues Roberts feels human rights provisions ad-
dress, that the law of occupation does not, are discrimination in
employment, education, and the import of educational materi-
als. These issues are, however, adequately addressed in Articles
27 (non-discrimination), 50 (education of children), 58 (import
of religious books and articles), and 142 (educational materials
for internees) of the Fourth Convention,'7  and Articles 69 and
70 (dealing with relief without adverse distinction) of Protocol
1,72 given the usual circumstances of the occupying power and
the nature of the relationship with the population. In most oc-
cupation situations, nothing more could realistically be expected
of an occupant than the current provisions, which are designed
specifically to deal with those circumstances. To insist that more
is required is only likely to encourage a disinclination by States
to accept the legal status of an occupant and the application of
international law regimes together.7 3
In fact, much of the argument on this issue has been politi-
cally distorted, centering on the Israeli occupied territories, and
must be weighed carefully in this light. Mazen Qupty, for exam-
ple, reflects upon the difficulty in separating this argument from
the political overlay. He is nevertheless forced to acknowledge
the lack of certainty in the position of those proposing the appli-
cation of human rights law.7 4 Marc Bernstein also highlights the
70. See id. at 53-57; see also Adam Roberts, The Applicability of Human Rights Law
During Military Occupations, 13 REv. OF INT'L STUD. 39, 47 (1987) [hereinafter Roberts,
Human Rights Law]; Adam Roberts, What Is a Military Operation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L
LAW 250, 287 (1985) [hereinafter Roberts, Military Operation]. This is in fact proving to
be the case in the Israeli/Palestinian settlement agreements. For example, the Protocol
Concerning Legal Matters states: "Both sides shall take all necessary measures to ensure
that the treatment of the individuals transferred under this article complies with the
applicable legal arrangements in Israel and in the Territory and with internationally-
accepted norms of human rights regarding criminal investigations." Israel-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Annex V - Protocol Concerning
Legal Matters, art. 11(7) (h) (1), Sept. 28, 1995, PLO-Isr., 36 I.L.M. 551, 637. The provi-
sions of the remainder of this and the other protocols, particularly relating to the safe-
guards and processes for dealing with persons accused of offenses, reflects the influ-
ence of human rights instruments.
71. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 27, 50, 58, 142.
72. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, arts. 69, 70.
73. Benvenisti documents well the trend in this reluctance, particularly since the
1970s. See Benvenisti, supra note 36, at 27-30.
74. See Mazen Qupty, The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as
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division of opinion and cannot commit to the application of this
law, notwithstanding that he believes the law does not pose a
problem for Israel in terms of the legality of Israel's actions, even
if it did apply.75 Richard Falk and Burns Weston, who take a
particularly strident position in allegations of breaches of inter-
national law against Israel concerning the occupied territories,
are only able to state that human rights law is "increasingly au-
thoritative" in such circumstances without being able to assert its
de jure application or explain what is meant by "increasingly au-
thoritative" as a category of international law.76
Yoram Dinstein is of the view that human rights law only
applies between a State and its citizens and not to occupied terri-
tories.7 7 In an article in which he sets out the distinction be-
tween human rights law and IHL in the context of their applica-
tion, Dinstein states that the nature of the two relationships is
entirely different, IHL requiring a special legal mechanism, and
that the codifications of this law in the Hague Regulations,
Fourth Convention and Protocol I cover the field.7" The Israeli
Supreme Court has also specifically rejected the application of
human rights instruments to occupied territories as irrelevant
and as applying only between States and their citizens.
It is highly doubtful that the arguments for the intrusion of
these laws into the body of law governing occupations would
find favor at this stage with the majority of countries. It would be
far more realistic to encourage compliance with the law as it
stands, which guarantees all the protections and imposes all the
obligations that occupations can viably sustain. As Adam Rob-
erts has pointed out, the application of human rights law to oc-
Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES supra note 51, at 87, 122-23 (Michael
Jackson trans.).
75. See Marc E. Bernstein, Freedom of Speech in the Israeli Occupied Territories: The
Search for a Standard, 21 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 533-37 (1989).
76. Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Israeli
and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 51, at 125, 148.
77. Interview with Yoram Dinstein, Vice President, Israel United Nations Associa-
tion, in Tel Aviv Univ., Isr. (Dec. 12, 1994) (on file with author).
78. See Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian
Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345-46, 349, 350-52, 355 (Theodor
Meron ed., 1984); see also Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARp.
INT'L L.J. 457, 476 (1991) (applying dejure the law of occupation to his analysis and
not human rights instruments).
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cupations would have no real practical value given the circum-
stances they normally occur in and the derogation provisions of
the human rights instruments. 79
This is not to say that human rights law should be disre-
garded. As a set of guidelines and objectives, they will be highly
relevant to non-belligerent occupations and pacific occupations
in particular. The pacific occupations of Cambodia and Bosnia
heavily featured these human rights objectives and seem to indi-
cate a trend in this regard. Particularly relevant in the collapsed
State scenario is the UDHR. This reflects the requirements of
the historic elements of non-belligerent occupation-that the
occupant promote the democratic process and work towards the
restoration of popular sovereignty at the earliest possible mo-
ment. This imperative is suggested by Article 21 of the UDHR. °
The fundamental principle, however, is that the specific provi-
sions of the law of occupation will override any contradictory
provision of the UDHR.
Other possible avenues of the application of human rights
law would be: (a) through those provisions that had been incor-
porated into domestic law prior to the commencement of the
occupation, which the occupying power would then be obliged
to respect, unless it were prevented from doing so for security
reasons or had the right to circumvent as provided by the provi-
sions of occupation law, and (b) where the forces of the occu-
pant had incorporated human rights provisions as regulating the
activities of its force in any circumstances, including occupa-
tions. This last case was the circumstance applying in relation to
the Canadian contingent in Somalia where a charge was brought
against an individual soldier for violations of the Torture Con-
vention, which had been incorporated into the Canadian Crimi-
nal Code under Section 269.1.81 This Convention was also spe-
cifically referred to by the prosecution at the trial of the individ-
ual in relation to the matter of sentencing. In addition, the
provisions of the human rights instruments could provide the
guidelines for determining which local laws were contrary to the
international "standards of civilization" permitting the occupy-
ing power to alter or ignore them. They could also serve as a
79. See Roberts, supra note 68, at 56-57.
80. See UDHR, supra note 62, art. 21.
81. See Canada Criminal Code, § 269.1, R.S. 1985, c. 10 (3d Supp.), s. 2.
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reference for the introduction of the occupying power's own
regulations seeking the improvement of the conditions of the
population, particularly in longer term or humanitarian occupa-
tions.
A more recent comment on this issue was the comment
passed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Bankovic
case in relation to the application of the European Convention
on Human Rights ("ECHR") .12 The Court rejected the extrater-
ritoriality of the ECHR obligations in respect of an aerial bomb-
ing campaign, but left open the question of its extraterritorial
effect in relation to military occupation and the exercise of effec-
tive control over foreign territory-a situation which the Court
was not called to rule upon in the Bankovic case. The European
Court may, therefore, be inclined to rule in favor of the applica-
tion of that Convention in military occupation situations in the
future. Further reinforcement of the broader application of
human rights instruments is contained in recent pronounce-
ments of the Human Rights Committee, which was established
pursuant to the ICCPR."3 This, however, seems to be contrary
to, or at least qualified by, the decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear
82. See generally Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Sixteen Other Contracting
States, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. The Bankovic case was an application made in Octo-
ber 1999 by a Serbian couple, Mr. and Mrs. Bankovic, who had lost their daughter
during NATO's bombing of the Serbian Radio-Television in April 1999, and another
four Yugoslav nationals, to the European Court of Human Rights. The claim was
against 17 European State members of NATO. The essence of the claim was that the
bombing had violated the European Convention on Human Rights. See id.
83. See Human Rights Comm., U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[CCPR], General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, 10-11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29,
2004). The Covenant applies to:
[T]hose [territories] within the power or effective control of the forces of a
State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which
such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a
national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keep-
ing or peace-enforcement operation.
Id. at 10. Paragraph 11 adds:
As implied in General Comment 29, the Covenant applies also in situations of
armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are appli-
cable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the
interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not
mutually exclusive.
Id. at 11 (citations omitted). As we shall see it is simply not accurate to state that
these respective bodies of law are complimentary and not mutually exclusive.
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Weapons Case, which found that where IHL applied dejure as the
lex specialis, it would take precedence over conventional human
rights law, such as the right to life.8 4 While the court in that case
accepted that the ICCPR would continue to apply in armed con-
flicts, it did not state whether this meant only within the territory
of a State Party or also to occupation situations.85 Clearly the
ICCPR foreshadows and provides for continuing application
within the territory of a State Party during time of "public emer-
gency," 6 but it is clear in its terms that it cannot apply dejure to
an occupation. This is indicated by the fact that occupations are
not included in the expanded situations of application for the
right of self-determination listed in Article 1 (3) ,87 while Article 2
otherwise confines application of the ICCPR to individuals
"within its tenitory and subject to its jurisdiction."8 8 The ICCPR
84. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ 226, 239-40,
24-25 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
85. See generally id. In terms of the relative legal merits of the General Comments
and the ICJ opinion it should be noted that General Comments of the Human Rights
Committee have no legal standing and are only for the purpose of assisting interpreta-
tion and application of ICCPR provisions. They are mentioned under Article 40 (4) of
the ICCPR but are not given the function of binding interpretations or directions. See
ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 40(4). The rulings of the ICJ are binding between or among
Parties to the particular case if they have agreed to be so bound under Article 36 of the
ICJ Statute but are not binding on any other State, nor are they binding on the Court
itself in any other matters. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
86. See ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 4:
(In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the pre-
sent Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.).
Id.
87. See id. art. 1(3) ("The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall
promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right,
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations") (emphasis
added).
88. Id. art. 2(1):
("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to en-
sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status).
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was drafted in 1966, many years after the GCIV of 1949, so that
occupations and the ICCPR relationship with the GCIV could
readily have been addressed had it been the intention of the par-
ticipants to supplement or override the GCIV.89 It was clearly
the intention of the participants in the GCIV process that addi-
tional human rights instruments and standards over and above
what was already laid out in that ICCPR were inappropriate. For
such an expanded interpretation to be truly effective, it would
need to be endorsed by a meeting of States Parties to the ICCPR.
The problem is that general statements on the mutual appli-
cation of IHL and human rights law are unhelpful. The issue
becomes what this means in practice. The occupation provisions
of the GCIV constitute an "exigency" human rights convention
in themselves and would appear to cover the field on all relevant
aspects of an occupation situation with respect to "human
rights." In some respects, it is in direct contradiction to the
ICCPR, yet, wherever it is specific on such matters, it must cer-
tainly take precedence over human rights conventions as the lex
specialis for military occupations. This principle of lex specialis
(derogat lex generali) referred to by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
Case is an established principle of international law that has its
roots in the writings of Grotius, who, in commenting on the rule
resolving conflicting international law documents, stated:
"Among those treaties which . . . are equal the preference is
given to such as are more particular, and approach nearer to the
point in question. For where particulars are stated, the case is
clearer, and requires fewer exceptions than general rules do."9
The rule has had wide application and acceptance by com-
mentators, arbitration panels, and courts.9 What the principle
89. See, for example, the way this is dealt with in the relational provisions used in
Articles 1 and 2 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. See Protocol Additional I, supra note
31, arts. 1-2.
90. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 193 (A.C. Campbell trans., M.
Walter Dunne 1901) (1670). Grotius cites the example given by Puffendorf to illustrate
his point, "[o]ne law forbids us to appear in public with arms on holidays: [sic] another
law commands us to turn out under arms and repair to our posts, as soon as we hear the
sound of the alarm bell. The alarm is rung on a holiday. In such case we must obey the
latter of the two laws, which creates an exception to the former." Id.
91. See, e.g., Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Indus-
try, WT/DS54R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (adopted July 23, 1998); see
also Report of the Panel, EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile,
12.28, L/6491-36S/93 Uune 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93, 12.1
(1990); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 96, 120 (2d ed.
204 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:181
of lex specialis requires, in effect, is that where there are two bod-
ies of law that cover a general subject but one of these addresses
a circumstance or matter in specific terms, or one body is gen-
eral and one specific, then the specific provisions control. Re-
garding the case in question, this could apply in one of two ways.
The provisions of IHL that expressly govern occupation situa-
tions thereby preclude all other bodies of law that do not specifi-
cally address occupations or alternately delineate their relation-
ship to the existing specific IHL provisions. A second manner of
application would be to reject such a global preclusion and ana-
lyze each human rights law provision to determine whether its
subject matter is either addressed by, or in fundamental conflict
with, a particular IHL provision applicable to occupations, and
thereby subordinate. It is submitted that the former is the cor-
rect position, but the latter case will also be considered for com-
pleteness.
In practical terms, it is hard to see which aspects of the
ICCPR would apply in a situation where the occupation provi-
sions of the GCIV also applied. The ICCPR is clearly designed to
regulate the relationship between a citizen and the sovereign
State,9 2 including an individual's political rights, which is inap-
propriate in an occupation situation.9" The truth is that the
ICCPR, as a matter of law and the likely override of its provisions
in a military occupation, can add nothing to the human rights
protections of the GCIV, and effort would be better directed in
ensuring compliance with the GCIV rather than engaging in ex-
tended debate on this point.94 Certainly, the ICCPR was not re-
ferred to, relied upon, or considered applicable by the Coalition
in Iraq following the invasion of 2003, who referred solely to the
law of occupation instruments as the lex specialis. This in itself is
evidence of State practice by Parties to the ICCPR as far as inter-
1984); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 l.C.J. 3, 40, 86 (May 24); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
art. 55, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 58, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch. IV.E.1 (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/53/53sess.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005);
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Ausfi. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148 (Int'l Trib.
L. of the Sea 1999).
92. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 2(1).
93. See PICTET, supra note 62, 128-37.
94. See Roberts, Human Rights Law, supra note 70, at 41, 45-46.
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pretation is concernedY
95. See Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, General Comments of
the United States on Basic Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Remedy for Vic-
tims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Aug. 15,
2003), available at http://www.usmission.ch (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (demonstrating
a clear statement of the U.S. position, delivered by Gilda Brancato, Attorney-Adviser
International from the Office of the Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees in
the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.):
Second, the United States Government reiterates its firm belief, expressed
at earlier stages of review and discussion, that the Principles should not ad-
dress International Humanitarian Law. By attempting to address both human
rights and [IHL], the Principles create conflict in a well-developed area of law
conceptually distinct from international human rights law. It is true that many
of the principles of humane treatment found in the law of armed conflict find
similar expression in human rights law. The well-renowned scholar Jean
Pictet, in a treatise on IHL ... stated that:
"Indeed, the law of conflicts and human rights have the same origin: they
stem from the need to protect the individual against those who would crush
him." Nevertheless, the two systems are quite distinct. Professor Theodor
Meron, currently the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, has written:
"Not surprisingly, it has become common in some quarters to conflate
human rights and the law of war/international humanitarian law. Neverthe-
less, despite the growing convergence of various protective trends, significant
differences remain. Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows, or at least
tolerates, the killing and wounding of innocent human beings not directly
participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian victims of lawful collateral
damage. It also permits certain deprivations of personal freedom without con-
victions in a court of law." Theodore Meron, The Humanization of Humanita-
rian Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 239, 240 (2002).
Further as Jean Pictet similarly observed, "Some writers on human rights
thought I was trying to merge human rights and the law of armed conflicts. It
would have been absurd to do so... What is important is to recognize that the
two fields are interrelated and, conversely, that they are distinct and should
remain so .... [T]he two legal systems are fundamentally different, for hu-
manitarian law is valid only in the case of an armed conflict while human
rights are essentially applicable in peacetime and contain derogation clauses
in case of conflict. Moreover, human rights governs relations between the
State and its own nationals, the law of war those between the State and enemy
nationals."
"There are also profound differences in the degree of maturity of the
instruments and in the procedures for their implementation. The Geneva
Conventions are universal and of a mandatory nature. This is certainly not the
case with human rights instruments. The systems of supervision and sanctions
are also different. Thus the two systems are complementary, and indeed they
complement one another admirably, but they must remain distinct, if only for
the sake of expediency." J. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of
War Victims pages 14-15 (1975).
As a further example of the distinction between the two bodies of law,
through international conventions (notably the Geneva Conventions of 1949)
and customary international law, IHL already recognizes various remedies for
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The Court in the subject opinion had regard to the decision
on the Nuclear Weapons Case but seriously misapplied the find-
ings. The Court described how certain States had argued that
"the Covenant was directed to the protection of human rights in
peacetime, but that questions relating to unlawful loss of life in
hostilities were governed by the law applicable in armed con-
flict." 6 The Court then asserted that this argument was rejected
as the decision went on to indicate that the ICCPR could con-
tinue in operation in conflicts, which is clearly the case within
the territory of a Party to the Covenant. 7 The Court quoted the
key paragraph on this point:
The Court observes that the protection of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times
of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time
of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not,
however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbi-
trarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities.
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however,
then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is de-
signed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.98
In its citation, the Court left off the important final sentence,
which states:
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary
deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can
only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed
transgressions, particularly in the context of international armed conflict and
regarding state responsibility. Indeed IHL imposes binding legal obligations
on States with respect to criminal sanctions, the duty to search for offenders of
certain violations, and compensation, which was recognized as an obligation as
early as the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. We are concerned that these
non-binding Principles being developed in this forum would be confusing
when placed alongside binding international obligations that States Parties to
IHL conventions have already undertaken for international armed con-
flict ....
... Accordingly, to avoid creating conflict and ambiguity in an already
well-developed area of law, we again recommend that the Principles address
human rights law, but not IHL.
Id.
96. See Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 239, 1 24 (July 8).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 240, 1 25.
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conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant it-
self.99
Somehow the Court has taken the Nuclear Weapons Case as
authority for the proposition that the ICCPR will apply to occu-
pation situations and that it must be applied in addition to the
relevant IHL. There is certainly nothing in the decision to sup-
port this, and the circumstance of occupations was not referred
to by the Court or in any of the submissions. Even if it were
accepted that the Nuclear Weapons Case decision intended to ex-
tend the ICCPR to cover occupations, the case is primarily au-
thority for the requirement to disregard the provisions of the
ICCPR where there is a lex specialis covering the issue. The
Court, having found in the subject case that the Hague Regula-
tions and the GCIV applied, was therefore obliged to resolve
those aspects with the human rights instruments, an obligation it
did not address.
B. Annexation & Self-Determination
If we accept the finding of the Court that the human rights
instruments they cite apply to occupied territory, the question
then becomes whether their evaluation of the application of the
provisions of those instruments is correct. We must first deal
with the overarching decision that the barrier was a breach of
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The
Court does not cite its assertion of the right of self-determina-
tion, but it is clearly referring to Article 1 of both the ICCPR and
the ICESCR. The Court claims that the parts of the barrier that
do not adhere to the so-called "Green Line" nominally dividing
Israeli territory from the occupied territories, amount to a de
facto annexation of those areas.' 0 This, of all the findings, is
the most blatantly political and devoid of legal substance. The
Court noted the frequent and unequivocal Israeli statements to
the effect that the sole purpose of the barrier was to combat the
current security threat, and that it was only a temporary mea-
sure. This includes the statement to the Security Council of 14
October 2003 that the fence does not annex territories to the
State of Israel and that it would be dismantled as part of any
99. Id.
100. See Advisory Opinion, 143 I.L.M. 1009, 1041, 115 (July 9, 2004).
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political settlement. 1O
This was followed by Israel's statement to the General As-
sembly on December 8, 2003 that "[a]s soon as the terror ends,
the fence will no longer be necessary. The fence is not a border
and has no political significance. It does not change the legal
status of the territory in any way. ' 10 2 Apart from these clearly
expressed positions, Israel has made no effort to extend the op-
eration of Israeli law to these areas or made any other legal or
political move to change the boundaries of current Israeli terri-
tory in relation to the path of the barrier. There is no concept
of "de facto annexation" in international law. Either there has
been an attempt to politically and legally annex territory, or
there has not. The only relevant considerations in making a le-
gal finding on this point are the official statements of Israel and
the objective facts as to whether political and legal steps have
been taken to incorporate the territory.
This position and the assertion that the barrier, therefore,
violates the right of self-determination caused great concern to
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal. Judge Higgins,
for example, described the Court's statement that the barrier se-
verely impedes the right of self-determination and is therefore a
breach of Israel's obligations as a "non sequitur." ' She stated
that:
[I] t seems to me quite detached from reality for the Court to
find that it is the wall that presents a "serious impediment" to
the exercise of this right. The real impediment is the appar-
ent inability and/or unwillingness of both Israel and Pales-
tine to move in parallel to secure the necessary conditions-
that is, at one and the same time, for Israel to withdraw from
Arab occupied territory and for Palestine to provide the con-
ditions to allow Israel to feel secure in so doing. The simple
point is underscored by the fact that if the wall had never
been built, the Palestinians would still not yet have exercised
their right to self-determination. It seems to me both unreal-
istic and unbalanced for the Court to find that the wall
(rather than "the larger problem," which is beyond the ques-
101. See id. at 1041, 1 116.
102. U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Spec. Sess., 23d mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/
PV.23 (Dec. 8, 2003).
103. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 1062, 28 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins).
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tion put to the Court for an opinion) is a serious obstacle to
self-determination. Nor is this finding any more persuasive
when looked at from a territorial perspective ..... Peoples"
necessarily exercise their right to self-determination within
their own territory. Whatever may be the detail of any finally
negotiated boundary, there can be no doubt, as is said in par-
agraph 78 of the Opinion, that Israel is in occupation of Pal-
estinian territory. That territory is no more, or less, under
occupation because a wall has been built that runs through
it.104
Judge Kooijmans reflected the same reasoning noting that
the campaign of terror was as much an "impediment" to achiev-
ing Palestinian self-determination as the barrier. 10 5 He felt that
the Court should have left issues of self-determination to the po-
litical process, as this is embedded in a much wider context than
the construction of the barrier and has to be resolved in that
wider context. He stated that, "[i] n my view the Court could not
have concluded that Israel had committed a breach of its obliga-
tion to respect the Palestinians' right to self-determination with-
out further legal analysis."' ' 6 Judge Buergenthal was adamant
that this issue could not be evaluated in isolation from the ques-
tion of the right of self-defense, which will be looked at more
closely below.'0 7
C. Specific Provisions of ICCPR, ICESCR & UNCROC
As was noted above, it is difficult to ascertain the precise
legal conclusions of the Court in relation to the specific provi-
sions of the human rights instruments it found applicable to the
case. Reference was made to Articles 12 and 17 of the ICCPR,'° 8
Articles 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the ICESCR °9 and Arti-
cles 16, 24, 27 and 28 of the UNCROC. 1" 0 These provisions will
therefore be examined to determine which are rendered nuga-
tory by the lex specialis of the Hague Regulations and the GCIV.
The first point to make about the general approach of the Court
104. Id. at 1062-63, 1 30-31.
105. See id. at 1067, 6 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
106. Id. at 1071-72, 1 31.
107. See id. at 1079, 4 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
108. See id. at 1045, 1 128.
109. See id. at 1049, 136.
110. See id. at 1046, 1 131.
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to the issue of the application of the ICCPR is one of unfairness
and legal error in reference to the relevance of the derogation
provisions of Article 4. The Court notes that Israel has formally
derogated from Article 9 of the ICCPR while it remains in the
state of emergency created by the long-running terrorist cam-
paign.111 The Court also notes that Israel does not accept the
application of the ICCPR to the occupied territories.1 1 2 This po-
sition not only supports the fact that no attempt at annexation
has been made, but particularly reflects the fact that Israel relies
on the Hague and the GCIV provisions for the primacy of secur-
ity measures, which would qualify the rights contained in the
human rights instruments. Nevertheless, the Court chose to ex-
tend Israel's derogation from Article 9 to the territories, thus
adopting an annexationist approach and acting in the place of
the Israeli Government. The Court further concluded that-
there being no other derogations-the rest of the ICCPR ap-
plied to the occupied territories."' l One major issue that arises
from this is the question of how the ICESCR and UNCROC are
affected by derogations under Article 4, as there are no deroga-
tion provisions in either of those instruments. The fact that such
provisions are absent is itself indicative of the fact that they were
not intended to apply to occupation situations or in times of
armed conflict, apart from the specific UNCROC provisions on
the issue of child soldiers. The Court did not address this point,
which stands as another fundamental flaw in the Opinion. The
Court dishonestly approaches the derogation issue as if the Is-
raeli Government has made a formal decision not to seek further
derogations of the ICCPR in relation to the occupied territories,
whereas Israel clearly relies on the security provisions in the IHL
instruments to regulate the relevant rights. The Court then fails
to analyze the relationship between these security provisions and
the human rights instruments or to take into account the mea-
sures promulgated by Israel under the security authorities of the
IHL instruments.
The position of the Court in relation to the issue of deroga-
tions is at the heart of the incompatibility and illogicality of as-
serting the ICCPR's application to occupation situations. The
111. See id. at 1045, 127.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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necessary conclusion from the Court's finding is that any State
that is a Party to the ICCPR, which finds itself in an occupation
situation, would be obliged to make a proclamation as to which
aspects of the instrument were to be derogated from during the
occupation. This is totally contradicted by the fact that the Oc-
cupying Power will always rely on the specific heads of security
authority contained in the IHL instruments to create security
provisions and operate in accordance with the limitations of the
instruments in this respect. Certainly in not one instance of a
military occupation has there been any such derogation procla-
mations by any State Party to the ICCPR so that the Court's posi-
tion is completely contradicted by State practice. Given that the
decision was not handed down until July 2004, it is curious that
the Court chose not to consider the contemporaneous Iraq ex-
perience to inform themselves in this respect. The Opinion also
does not take note of and address the official comments of one
of the Occupying Powers specifically on this point.114 This itself
amounted to a failure of the Court to adhere to Article 38 of its
own Statute. a5 This position also flies in the face of the specific
legal obligations contained in the Hague Regulations (Article
43)116 and the GCIV (Article 64)117 that the Occupying Power
must respect the laws in force in the country and that the penal
laws are generally to remain in force. It has been established by
authoritative commentators in this respect that it would be a
breach of the Occupying Power's authority to apply its own law
to the occupied territory."1 ' This means that asserting the appli-
114. See generally U.S. ARmy, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 55.
115. See ICJ Statute, supra 85, art. 38(1):
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions,
whether general or particular establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as sub-
sidiary means for the determination of law.
Id.
116. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 35 Stat. 2277, art. 43 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
117. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 64.
118. See, e.g., VON GLAHN, supra note 56, at 94 ("It is also commonly accepted as fact
that the occupant cannot apply his own domestic laws to the occupied territory until
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cation of the domestic ICCPR regime of an Occupying Power in
occupied territory would be unlawful.
Moving on to the specific provisions, the Court refers to
ICCPR Article 17, which states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour
and reputation.""' 9 Nowhere in the Opinion, however, does the
Court analyze this provision or say how it has been violated or
how it would apply. The only comment regarding Article 17 is
the statement that it contains no qualifying clause. The Court
ignores that this provision may be derogated from under Article
4, thus indicating that in security emergencies, equivalent to an
occupation situation, this right may be subject to limitation. The
various security provisions and basic humanitarian safeguards in
the Hague Regulations and the GC1V, in fact, clearly render this
provision nugatory. There are basic heads of authority for secur-
ity action in these instruments that will be relevant to all the dis-
cussion that follows.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations authorizes the Occupy-
ing Power to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure
public order, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country. 12 1 Under Article 52, the Occupying
Power may requisition private property for the needs of the army
of occupation as long as it is duly paid for and/or returned. 12
The GCIV makes provision in Article 78 for the holding of secur-
ity internees and may keep certain of such persons incommuni-
cado under Article 5.122 In accordance with Article 28, the pres-
ence of protected persons may not be used to render points or
areas immune from military operations. 23 Article 49 permits
the Occupying Power to undertake total or partial evacuation of
a given area if the security of the population or imperative mili-
tary reasons so demand. 24 Article 53 allows the destruction of
real or personal property belonging individually or collectively
proper title has been secured to the area in question, either following debellatio of the
legitimate sovereign or through the provisions of a treaty of peace").
119. ICCPR, supra note 31, art. 17.
120. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43.
121. See id. art. 52.
122. See GCIV, supra note 59, arts. 5, 78.
123. See id. art. 28.
124. See id. art. 49.
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to private persons, to the State, to other public authorities, or to
social or cooperative organizations, where such destruction is
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. 125 Article
64 provides for the ability to repeal or suspend the penal laws of
the occupied territory by the Occupying Power in cases where
they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the appli-
cation of the Convention.1 26 The Occupying Power may also
subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions
which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its
obligations under the Convention, to maintain the orderly gov-
ernment of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occu-
pying Power, of the members and property of the occupying
forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and
lines of communication used by them.
The Israeli authorities have put in place a wide range of pro-
visions and administrative arrangements pursuant to these au-
thorities, none of which were considered by the Court for their
relevance or lawfulness. Examples include the administrative
mechanisms by which routing decisions are made, the require-
ment for Israeli forces to adhere to Israeli administrative law pro-
visions in making decisions, and the provision for affected Pales-
tinians to petition the Israeli Courts. The Israeli Supreme Court
decision in Beit Sourik, referred to above,1 2 7 is a good illustration
of the type of analyses the Court should have applied to the
Opinion in this respect.
In relation to the human rights safeguards contained in the
Hague Regulations and the GCIV that further render Article 17
nugatory, Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, in particular,
states that, "[f] amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.' 12
Adding to this, Article 27 of the GCIV sets out that:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to re-
spect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
125. See id. art. 58.
126. See id. art. 64.
127. See generally HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr., 43 I.L.M.
1099 (2004).
128. Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 12. The meaning of the prohibition
on confiscation is as opposed to lawful requisition and denotes the permanent acquisi-
tion of property without compensation. See id.
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religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and
shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or
threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on
their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitu-
tion, or any form of indecent assault. Without prejudice to
the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all
protected persons shall be treated with the same considera-
tion by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, with-
out any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, relig-
ion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control
and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a
result of the war.' 29
Beyond any doubt, therefore, there is no aspect of Article 17 that
would be applicable in an occupation situation.
Similar considerations apply to the Court's reference to the
ICCPR Article 12(1) that "[e]veryone lawfully within the terri-
tory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence."' ° In this
instance, there is at least some guidance as to the Court's view of
the relationship of this provision to the facts through the Court's
reference to the fact that the barrier "and its associated regime
impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory." ' 1 Clearly, the security provisions set
out above and the specific regime of regulation established by
the Israelis render this provision inapplicable. The Court should
have assessed the Israeli action in accordance with the test of
proportionality as the key relevant legal consideration to applica-
ble lex specialis. The analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court in this
respect is instructive and should have been referred to by, and
guided, the Court. 3 2 Judge Kooijmans, in his opinion, also
found the failure to apply the proportionality test a deficiency in
the Opinion.'3 3
In relation to the ICESCR, the Court first cited an alleged
129. GCIV, supra note 60, art. 27 (emphasis added).
130. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 12.
131. Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, at 1048, 91134.
132. See Beit Sourik, 43 I.L.M. 1099, 1113-16 36-44.
133. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1072, 34 (separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans).
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failure to comply with Article 4, requiring that the implementa-
tion of the restrictions on the Palestinian's economic, social, and
cultural rights must be "solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society."'3 4 This is an absurd
proposition in light of the security provisions set out above.
Clearly, any such requirement is thoroughly overridden by the
provisions of the Hague Regulations and the GCIV, and no occu-
pying power would ever consider itself bound by this require-
ment with respect to taking necessary security measures. Once
again, the general economic, social, and cultural welfare of the
population is specifically addressed in provisions of the IHL in-
struments. In addition to the provisions set out above, these in-
clude Articles 47 through 51 and 53 through 56 of the Hague
Regulations' 35 and the bulk of the provisions in Parts II and III,
and Sections I, II and III of the GCIV.'36 With regard to the
Court's reference to the right to work provisions in Articles 6
and 7 of the ICESCR,137 it should be noted that the security pro-
visions in Articles 51 and 52 of the GCIV138 cover this aspect in
tandem with the general requirement to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public life under Article 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions. 1 39
The Court cites in general terms various overlaying provi-
sions of the ICESCR and UNCROC relating to protection for
families and children contained in Articles 10, 13 and 14 of the
former 14 and Articles 16, 24, 27 and 28 of the latter. Article
16 of UNCROC is an exact repetition of the wording in ICCPR
Article 17, except that the words "[n]o one" are substituted by
the words "[n]o child.' 4 2 The same considerations therefore
134. Id. at 1049, 136.
135. See Hague Regulations, supra note 117, arts. 47-51, 53-56.
136. See generally GCIV, supra note 60.
137. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, at 1046, 1 130.
138. See GC1V, supra note 60, arts. 51, 52.
139. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43. The issue of mistranslation is
also set out here. See id.
140. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, at 1046, 130 (citing ICESCR, supra note
33, arts. 10, 13, 14).
141. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, at 1046, 131 (citing UNCROC, supra
note 34, arts. 16, 24, 27, 28).
142. See UNCROC, supra note 34, art. 16(1) ("No child shall be subjected to arbi-
trary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation."); see also ICCPR, supra
note 32, art. 17(1) ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
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apply to this provision as to the ICCPR provision with the addi-
tional consideration of the provisions of the GCIV that relate to
children. 4 ' Article 10 of the ICESCR contains general aspira-
tional statements on the family and children and specifically
comment on the working conditions of mothers.'4 4 All such is-
sues are covered in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations' 4 5 and
Articles 13, 16 through 18, 20 through 27, and 49 through 51 of
the GCIV.1 46  These provisions demonstrate a clear intent to
cover the field as all that can be reasonably expected of an occu-
pying power. Similarly, Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR 147 and
28 of the UNCROC t4 8 dealing with education are made redun-
dant by the provisions of GCIV Articles 24 and 50.149 Once
again, this is all that could be expected of an occupying power,
and indeed greater interference with the education system of
the sort described in some parts of the human rights instruments
would be assuming the longer term rights of a sovereign, thereby
overstepping occupation authority and thereby appearing "an-
nexationist.'1 5' Articles 24 and 27 of UNCROC deal with the
health of children, their access to health facilities (along with
their mothers) and their standard of living generally. 5 ' These
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his hon-
our and reputation.").
143. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 14, 17, 23, 24, 38.5, 50, 82, 89, 94, 132.
144. See ICECSR, supra note 33, art. 10.
145. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 46.
146. See CCIV, supra note 60, arts. 13, 16-18, 20-27, 49-51.
147. See ICESCR, supra note 33, arts. 13-14.
148. See UNCROC, supra note 34, art. 28.
149. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 24:
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families
as a result of the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their mainte-
nance, the exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated in all
circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to per-
sons of a similar cultural tradition.
Id. ("The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local au-
thorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and educa-
tion of children."). Id. art. 50.
150. Despite the examples of interference in education perpetrated by occupiers
with particular ideologies (such as Nazism and Communism), von Glahn summarizes
the state of the law, stating that "the occupant in essence may control and supervise
only such aspects of an educational system in occupied enemy territory as affect directly
the military occupation and the conduct of hostilities. Beyond this point no interfer-
ence appears to be permissible." VoIN GCAHN, supra note 56, at 64.
151. See UNCROC, supra note 34, arts. 24, 27.
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are subjects given special and specific attention in Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations (the aspect relating to public life)1 52 and
Articles 16-18, 20-23, 50, 55, 56, 58 and 59 of the GCIV. 153 Fi-
nally, the Court specifically cites the provisions of Articles 11 and
12 of the ICESCR dealing with standard of living, including
clothing and housing, food security, and health generally.' 54
Once again, these have been covered in the provisions of the
IHL instruments already cited.155 From this survey it can be seen
that there is no aspect of the human rights instruments' provi-
sions cited by the Court that has not been excluded by the lex
specialis provisions of the IHL instruments. The Court's recourse
to these provisions was therefore wrong in law and it should have
confined itself to an analysis of the adherence by Israel to the
relevant IHL.
D. Remaining Provisions of the ICCPR
The Court only cited two provisions of the ICCPR as being
relevant to the Opinion (Articles 12 through 17)156 although it
might have included Article 9 if Israel had not derogated from it
in relation to its own territory. What of the remaining provisions
of the ICCPR? To what extent might they have any relevance to
an occupation situation? If we were to look at the remaining
provisions and none of them were to survive the lex specialis test,
then would this not add weight to the broader argument against
the applicability of international human rights law as a whole to
IHL-encompassed situations? We will now therefore examine
Part III (Articles 6 through 27) of the ICCPR.15 7
As noted above, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case clearly
determined that Article 6(1) of the ICCPR is subordinate to
IHL. 58 A number of other provisions are set out in Article 6
relating to the issue of the death penalty. These include assur-
152. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43.
153. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 16-18, 20-23, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59.
154. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1046, 130 (citing ICESCR, supra note
33, arts. 11, 12).
155. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, arts. 14, 15, 33, 34, 63, 64(3), 69, 70,
74-78 (providing more detailed coverage of family and child welfare).
156. See Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1046, 1049, 129, 136 (citing ICCPR,
supra note 32, arts. 12, 19).
157. See ICCPR, supra note 32, arts. 6-27.
158. See Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 239-40, 24-25 (July 8).
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ing that the penalty is limited to serious crimes 159 and rendered
by a competent court, 6 ° that the right to seek pardon1 6 1 or com-
mutation is available, and that it should not be imposed on preg-
nant women or on persons under the age of eighteen. 62 All
these issues are specifically picked up in the quite detailed provi-
sions governing process in the GCIV (Articles 64 through 77)163
and Additional Protocol I (Articles 75 through 77).164 There is
no question that the whole of Article 6 will be subordinate to this
detailed body of law. Article 7 of the ICCPR deals with tor-
ture. 1 15 Once again, this is specifically addressed in Article 32 of
the GCIV, 16 6 Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1,167 and the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment. 161 It is interesting to note that
this latter instrument was drafted to specifically deal with peace
and armed conflict contexts and addresses the need for the in-
struction of both civil and military authorities.' 69 It is precisely
this specificity that is missing in the ICCPR, which tends to fur-
ther indicate its subordination to IHL.
Article 8 of the ICCPR deals with the regulation of labor
and with labor as the punishment for criminal convictions.1
71
Apart from the obligation to apply whatever local laws exist on
the question of labor 1 71 so long as they do not clash with the
application of the GCIV,1 7 2 there are also specific provisions on
labor issues in the GCIV. 1 73 The question of criminal penalties is
also governed by Article 67 of the GCIV.'74 Article 8 of the
159. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 6(2).
160. See id.
161. See id. art. 6(4).
162. See id. art. 6(5).
163. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 64-77.
164. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, arts. 75-77.
165. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 7.
166. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 32.
167. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, art. 75.
168. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027
(entered into force June 26, 1987).
169. See id. arts. 2, 5, 10.
170. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 8(3).
171. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43; see also GCIV, supra note 60,
art. 51.
172. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 64.
173. See id. arts. 51, 52.
174. See id. art. 67.
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ICCPR is a good example of a provision that is in total contradic-
tion to authorities contained in the IHL instruments. 75 In Arti-
cles 8(3) (a) and (c), there is a prohibition on forced or compul-
sory labor.1 76 Article 51 of the GCIV, however, provides that the
Occupying Power may compel protected persons over the age of
eighteen years to perform work that is necessary either for the
needs of the army of occupation, for the public utility services,
or for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health
of the population of the occupied country.1 7 7 The prohibition
on slavery in Article 8 of the ICCPR is covered by the prohibi-
tions on the transfer of persons from the occupied territory in
the GCIV Article 49 and the inability to compel labor for other
than as provided in the GCIV Article 51 .178 Article 8 of the
ICCPR is therefore subordinated to all these provisions and is
rendered nugatory.
Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of the ICCPR all relate to
criminal law and process and the treatment of detainees. 179
Apart from the obligation to respect and leave in operation the
local law, these subjects are specifically addressed in Articles 64
through 143 of the GCIV and Articles 75 through 77 of Addi-
tional Protocol 1.18 ° They are also subject to the security authori-
ties available to the Occupying Power. The ICCPR Articles are
therefore subordinate to these IHL provisions and rendered nu-
gatory.
Articles 2, 16, 18, 20, 26 and 27 of the ICCPR all deal with
the status of persons, discrimination, and freedom of religion. 181
The GCIV and Additional Protocol I provide legal recognition
and status through the categorizations of "protected persons,"
"civilians" and "persons in the power a Party to the conflict."
"Protected persons" are defined in Articles 4182 and 1118" of the
175. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 8.
176. See id. arts. 8(3)(a), (c).
177. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 51.
178. See id. arts. 49, 51. These are provisions that were drafted in direct reference
to the Nazi slave labor activities during World War II. See, e.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red
Cross [ICRC], Commentaries: Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 49 [hereinafter ICRC Commenta-
ries]; id. at art. 51.
179. See ICCPR, supra note 32, arts. 9-11, 13-15.
180. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 64-143; see also Protocol Additional I, supra note
31, arts. 75-77.
181. See ICCPR, supra note 32, arts. 2, 16, 18, 20, 26, 27.
182. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 4 ("Persons protected by the Convention are
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GCIV (which is reinforced by the specific inclusion of refugees
and stateless persons by Article 73 of Additional Protocol I); "ci-
vilians" are defined in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I,184
while Article 75 of Additional Protocol I deals with "persons in
the power of a Party to the conflict."'a8 5 All these persons are
prevented from being denied legal status by Articles 8 and 47 of
the GCIV.'8 6 Protection from discrimination is provided by Arti-
cles 13 and 27 of the GCIV and Article 75 of Additional Protocol
1.187 Religious freedom and considerations are dealt with in Arti-
cles 23, 24, 58, 76 and 93 of the GCIV and Articles 15 and 69 of
Additional Protocol 1.188
Article 19 of the ICCPR deals with freedom of expression."i 9
As is to be expected in an occupation situation, the provision for
this freedom runs head on into the security provisions of IHL.
In the first place, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations the
Occupying Power is authorized to take "all measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order."'9 °
Further reference to the ability to impose security related mea-
sures, which would include restrictions on freedom of expres-
sion, is contained in Articles 27 and 64 of the GCJV. 19' In addi-
tion, under Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, the Occupying
Power has sweeping authority with respect to the seizure of "[a] 11
appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the
transmission of news . . . even if they belong to private individu-
als."' 92 It is a well accepted principle that there is no clearer and
broader authority of the Occupying Power than the control over
the media and the ability to place limitations on free speech dur-
ing the tenure of the occupation based on security concerns.'93
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals.").
183. See id. art. 11.
184. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, art. 50.
185. Id. art. 75.
186. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 8, 47.
187. See id. arts. 13, 27; see also Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, arts. 15, 69.
188. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 23, 24, 58, 76, 93; Protocol Additional I, supra
note 31, arts. 15, 69.
189. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 19.
190. Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43.
191. See GCIV, supra note 60, arts. 27, 64.
192. Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 53.
193. See VON GLAHN, supra note 56, at 139, 215, 265.
2005] CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 221
This is further illustrated by the ability to keep certain detained
persons incommunicado under Article 5, and the provision re-
lating to the control of the flow of information between family
members under Article 25. One safeguard offering some protec-
tion for freedom of expression, however, was included in Article
70 of the GCIV, which provides that "[p]rotected persons shall
not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying
Power for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the
occupation, or during a temporary interruption thereof, with
the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war."'194
This was extended to a degree by the introduction of Article 75
of Additional Protocol I, which provided that the protections of-
fered in the Article were available "without any adverse distinc-
tion based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth
or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall
respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices
of all such persons. '  Privately held beliefs, opinions and con-
victions are, therefore, to be permitted, even if there may be lim-
itations or prohibitions placed on the ability to express these
during the occupation. Given these clear provisions and param-
eters, there can be no question that the issue of freedom of ex-
pression in an occupation will be exclusively governed by the
above provisions and Article 19 of the ICCPR will be subordi-
nated and redundant for the duration of the occupation.
Similar considerations apply to Articles 21 and 22 of the
ICCPR dealing with the right of peaceful assembly and freedom
of association, including to form and join trade unions. In rela-
tion to the trade union aspect, this will be additionally governed
by the considerations discussed above concerning the regulation
of labor in general. It will readily be appreciated that an occupy-
ing power will wish to retain wide rights of regulation with re-
gard to demonstrations, association, and gatherings that should
only be read in conjunction with the humanitarian requirements
set out in the IHL instruments. The IHL instruments address
and describe fully all the human rights that can and may be ex-
pected to be exercised in an occupation situation to the exclu-
sion of such rights as legally sustainable against an occupying
194. GCIV, supra note 60, art. 70.
195. Protocol Additional I, supra note 31, art. 75.
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power. It is for the Occupying Power to determine the extent to
which it will permit these freedoms to be exercised, but it has
not been the practice of occupying powers to regard these
ICCPR rights as in any way constraining the security discretion
and authorities available to them. The ICCPR provisions are
therefore directly contradicted by these discretions and authori-
ties and by State practice in this regard.
Article 23 of the ICCPR deals with the family and the right
of men and women to marry and to do so consensually.' 96 It also
provides for the equality of spouses during marriage and at its
dissolution. This aspect of the life of a nation is heavily inter-
twined with cultural issues. There are many States and cultural
traditions that have not given effect to these provisions, least of
all the countries of the Middle East, including the territories oc-
cupied by Israel. Is the Court asserting that Israel must adhere
to the ICCPR, and, not having derogated from this provision,
therefore required to interfere with the traditions and family law
of the occupied territories? Of course, if Israel was to do so,
there would rightly be an outcry that this would be an annexa-
tionist act and culturally insensitive or imperialist. Article 23 is
one of the provisions of the ICCPR that clearly indicates that it is
an instrument aimed at regulating the relationship between a
sovereign and its citizens, and has no relevance to the temporary
circumstances of occupation where the Occupying Power is an
ad interim sovereign. The application of Article 23 is excluded by
virtue of the obligation under Article 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions to respect "unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country" and under the requirement in Article 27 of the
GCIV to respect the existing family rights, religious practices,
manners and customs of protected persons. Interfering with the
family law of an occupied territory would be ultra vires for an
occupying power as a flagrant interference with the rights of the
sovereign. The only possible basis for interference in this area
would be if the laws were a source of racial discrimination or
genocide, such as the Nazi family laws. In that case, the obliga-
tions on the Occupying Power under Article 27 of the GCIV to
administer the territory without racial discrimination would pro-
vide authority for such interference. 197
196. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 23.
197. See GCIV, supra note 60, art. 27 ("[AIll protected persons shall be treated with
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The rights of children are also specifically addressed in de-
tail in the IHL instruments discussed above and, therefore, Arti-
cle 24 of the ICCPR would be subordinate and redundant. Fi-
nally, Article 25 of the ICCPR is another example of a provision
clearly indicative of the regulation of the relationship between
the citizen and the sovereign. It sets out the right to take part in
public affairs and public service directly or through freely cho-
sen representatives, to be able to vote in genuine periodic elec-
tions affording universal and equal suffrage and to guarantee
the free expression and will of the electors. a98 Nothing could be
more in conflict with the basis on which an occupation is con-
ducted. The provisions governing military occupation envisage
a temporary state of affairs in a conflict or post-conflict environ-
ment when the holding of elections would be impossible, im-
practical, or undesirable. The advent of the U.N. Charter makes
it clear that the Occupying Power cannot play a unilateral deter-
minative role in the political structure of the occupied territory
and could only do so in coordination with the Security Council.
Such unilateral interference is also prohibited under the law of
occupation.1 99 Certainly there would be nothing to prevent an
the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.").
198. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 25.
199. See VON GLAHN, supra note 56, at 96. Von Glahn explains:
Just as an occupant is bound ... to maintain the laws in force in occupied
enemy territory, so he is forbidden to change the internal administration of
the area. By that is meant that he may not substitute a new indigenous govern-
mental structure or change internal boundaries, except, in the latter case, on
a temporary basis to protect the safety of his armed forces and to realize the
purposes of the war.
Id. In one sense this is an extension of Grotius's principle that the status of occupied
territory cannot be changed until settled by treaty and that under occupation:
Lands are not understood to become a lawful possession and absolute con-
quest from the moment they are invaded. For although it is true that, that an
army takes immediate and violent possession of the country it has invaded, yet
that can only be considered as a temporary possession, unaccompanied with
any of the rights and consequences alluded to in this work, till it has been
ratified and secured by some durable means, by cession, or treaty.
GROTIUS, supra note 90, at 336. Georg Schwarzenberger adds that "[t]he first function
of the law of belligerent occupation consists in drawing a firm line between wartime
occupation and any pretension to the acquisition of a definitive territorial title through
unilateral annexation." SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 49, at 163. Furthermore,
Schwarzenberger states that the constraint on the Occupying Power to respect local law
"powerfully supports the rule prohibiting wartime annexation." Id. at 201. Note that
the political transition arrangements in Iraq were not done pursuant to the authority of
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occupying power allowing normal participation in public affairs,
public service and elections, but it is beyond question that there
is no obligation on the Occupying Power arising from the ICCPR
in this respect. This would specifically be overridden by and sub-
ject to the IHL security provisions, and, in particular, to the au-
thority of the Occupying Power to establish its own temporary
administration and to dismiss public officials.2z°
E. Self-Defense
Perhaps the most controversial and least supportable aspect
of the ruling is the comment on self-defense. The Court consid-
ered whether Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, enshrining the in-
herent right of self-defense, could be relied upon by Israel to
support the erection of the barrier. The Court defined Article
51 in these terms: "Article 51 of the Charter thus recognises the
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of
armed attack by one State against another State. However Israel
does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a for-
eign State."2 1
Israel's right of self-defense against armed attack emanating
from the territories was denied. This was the extent of the dis-
cussion on the point of Article 51, notwithstanding the vast
amount of discussion, deliberation, and State practice on this is-
sue. First, it is important to recall the exact words of Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self defence if an armed at-
tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
the Occupying Powers but on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1483 and
1511.
200. See Hague Regulations, supra note 116, art. 43; see also GCIV, supra note 60,
arts. 54, 64. In regard to Article 54, note the ICRC commentary:
The last sentence of Article 54 confirms the Occupying Power's right to re-
move public officials from their posts for the duration of occupation. That is a
right, of very long standing, which the occupation authorities may exercise in
regard to any official or judge, whatever his duties, for reasons of their own.
ICRC Commentaries, supra note 177, art. 54.
201. Advisory Opinion, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1050, 139 (emphasis added).
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Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.20 2
The Article refers only to "armed attack" occurring against a
Member State and in no way qualifies this by stating that the
attack must be committed by or emanate from another State.20 3
Apart from this, the Article makes it clear that the Charter in no
way impaired the "inherent right of individual or collective self
defence. '20 4 The intention and effect of the Article is, therefore,
to enshrine the rights and law governing self-defense that pre-
existed the Charter but still place this in the context of the new
reality that the Security Council had at least the right to inter-
vene to assume responsibility and control of the use of force in
the situation.
Certainly at the time of drafting the provision there had not
historically been as many instances of transnational terrorist ac-
tions not directly or not clearly attributable to a State. There
had nevertheless been numerous examples of extraterritorial law
enforcement and response to armed bands conducting cross-
border activity. The most famous authority of all for establishing
the principles of self-defense was just such an instance. In 1837,
an incident occurred in the Niagara River area in North America
involving the destruction of a ship, the Caroline, by British forces.
The correspondence that followed between the United States
and Great Britain formed the basis for customary principles of
self-defense that have been referred to, and relied upon, ever
since.2 "5 The interesting point about the incident is that it in-
volved the conduct of hostile activities by armed and organized
202. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
203. It is clear that current State practice and the determinative authority of the
Security Council have converged to make it absolutely clear that armed attacks include
those committed by terrorist organizations. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th
Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
204. It was stated in the committee discussion of Article 51 at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945 that "the use of arms in legitimate self defence remains admitted
and unimpaired." Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission 1, 6 Docs U.N.
Conf. Int'l Org. 446, 459 (1945). This understanding is supported by many commenta-
tors and it was also confirmed in the Nicaragua case. See Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 211 (June 27); see also I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 274 (1963).
205. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AMER. J. OF INr'L LAW 82,
82 (1938).
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citizens of the United States across the border in the British
province of Canada, in support of a rebellion in that province.
These actions were not supported or conducted in any way by
the U.S. government, but it was unable to prevent them. The
ship that was sunk had been running arms and supplies to the
Canadian rebels, and it was clear that it would continue to do so.
The British attempted to resolve the matter through approaches
to the United States and the Governor of New York in particular,
but to no avail. As a result, a party of eight British soldiers
crossed to U.S. territory, captured the vessel, and destroyed it.
Two U.S. citizens were killed in the action. The United States
protested and the British responded in justification that the ves-
sel was "piratical" in character, the laws of the United States were
not being enforced, and the action was warranted in self-de-
fense.2" 6 The United States' reply set out the famous principle
that to qualify as self-defense the necessity for action must be
"instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no mo-
ment for deliberation."20 7 The British authorities would then be
required to show that they did nothing "unreasonable or exces-
sive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self defence, must
be limited by that necessity" and that "admonition or remon-
strance" with the crew was "impracticable. '"2 8
The U.S. authorities questioned whether these tests had
been met in the Caroline instance. The British responded by ad-
ding the consideration of "how long could a Government, hav-
ing the paramount duty of protecting its own people, be reason-
ably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to ex-
pect."2 °9 The dispute was settled amicably by 1842 and no
reparation or redress was required of the British. The United
States was to take the principles established by this exchange and
apply them many times in the future. One example was the mili-
tary expedition launched into Mexico in 1916 to repress the ban-
dits of Francisco ("Pancho") Villa. President Wilson justified the
action on the basis that the Mexican government was unable to
prevent the cross-border activities of the bandits and there was
206. See id. at 85.
207. Id. at 89.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 83-90 (detailing the record of the correspondence).
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no other way to stop them.21° Michael Reisman summarizes the
doctrine arising from the Caroline as allowing:
[A] target state to act unilaterally against a planned terrorist
act emanating from the territory of another state, if it were
clear that either of two conditions obtained: (1) the state
from whose territory the action was emanating could not,
even with the information supplied to it by the target, re-
spond in timely fashion to prevent the terrorist act because of
a shortage of time; or (2) the state from whose territory the
action was emanating could not, even with adequate notice,
act effectively to arrest the terrorist action. A military action
in another state would be justified only if it could be related
to deterrence of further terrorist actions.
2 1 1
This argument could only operate a fortiori in relation to terri-
tory not having acquired legal standing as a State, particularly
where there is no prospect of the indigenous security elements
being able to bring the threat under control. Added to this
would be that the methods would have to be proportional and
designed to minimize collateral damage. Yoram Dinstein refers
to this "extra-territorial law enforcement" as a category of self-
defense and asserts that it is exercisable where the State from
which the attacks emanate is unable or unwilling to act to pre-
vent it. 2 1 2 From this discussion, it can be clearly seen that the
Court in the present case has come to a profoundly flawed con-
clusion with respect to the right of self-defense, and it should in
no way be regarded as a correct statement of the law.
CONCLUSION
The result of the above analysis leads to the conclusion that
the ICJ has performed a disservice to the development of inter-
national law in the areas of IHL and self-defense, in particular.
If one were to lay aside the jurisdictional issue as to whether the
Court should have entertained the matter at all, there was an
opportunity to attempt to resolve human rights and IHL with
respect to occupation situations. This opportunity was rejected
and reflects the inadequacy of the scholarly foundation of the
210. See 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES, § 68 n.21 (2nd ed. 1945).
211. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 3, 46-47 (1999).
212. See YoRAM DINSTEN, IWAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENCE 242 (2d ed. 1994).
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decision. The effect can only be further confusion for the mili-
tary and other practitioners in the field leading to a disinclina-
tion to resolve these issues or come to grips with the law. As
stated, the objective of the Court should have been to encourage
adherence to the clear IHL provisions rather than to muddy the
waters further by attempting to assert a relationship with inappo-
site human rights law that it made no attempt to reconcile. En-
couraging adherence to highly credible and concrete IHL would
have delivered the desired result of promoting the interests of
the affected Palestinians. The correct path in this respect has
been demonstrated by the Israeli Supreme Court with real and
beneficial outcomes.
This lack of scholarly rigor and analysis carried through to
the paltry comments on the issue of self-defense. With such an
array of State practice, commentary, Security Council resolu-
tions, and case law available on this subject, this can only be de-
scribed as judicial negligence. The proof of this will be in the
total disregard for this position in the Security Council and by
Member States.
In the absence of an analysis by the Court, this Article has
attempted to deal with the lex specialis issue in terms of the rela-
tionship between the human rights instruments and IHL provi-
sions. It is asserted that this exercise establishes that the protec-
tion offered by the relevant IHL is adequate to the task, and that,
in all key respects, it covers the field and takes precedence over
the human rights provisions. The circumstances in which IHL
provisions apply are the key to understanding why this must be
so and why it is the only logical approach.
The pity of this decision and the clear inability of the Court
to rise above the charged politics of the subject matter is that it
adds grist to the mill of those who will argue analogously that the
International Criminal Court cannot be entrusted with the fate
of Member State military personnel. For all of these reasons,
this decision will appear historically as the low point of the ICJ
and will carry no weight in the serious discussion of the key inter-
national law principles it traversed.
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